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from the Judgment and Orders of the Honorable Timothy Hansen, District Judge.
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Residing at 1583 North Sundown Way
Eagle, Idaho 83616
For Appellant

Jeffrey A. Thomson; James D. LaRue
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I. SANCTIONABLE CONDUCT

5

A. RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL RENDERED A DUBIOUS OATH UNDER PENALTY
OF PERJURY CONCERNING THE EXTENSION OF TIME NECESSARY TO FILE
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

In his AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, dated June 14, 2012, respondent's
counsel stated the following: " ... the drafting of the Respondent's Brief and my client's internal
review process cannot be completed within the time remaining. The thirty six (36) day
extension is sought in order to accommodate schedules and ensure filing of the Brief within the
extended period." (Emboldening and underlining added.)

In actuality, respondent's briefwas filed on June 26, 2012. This was only seven (7) days after the
original due date for the filing of the brief, which was June 19, 2012. Therefore, contrary to what
was stated under oath in the above affidavit, an extension of only one week not five weeks and
one day was necessary to draft and file respondent's brief.

Appellant was shocked and amazed to receive the MOTION and AFFIDAVIT referred to above.
There are two reasons for appellant's reaction. The first is that appellant believed respondent's
counsel's affidavit in which counsel stated that he required the thirty-six (36) day extension "to
accommodate schedules and ensure filing of the brief within the extended period,"
(Emboldening and underlining added)

The second is that respondent's counsel confirmed, under penalty of perjury, that all the
statements in the AFFIDAVIT were essentially true and accurate to the best of his knowledge.
6

When appellant received respondent's brief on June 27, 2012, it seemed evident that the service
of the brief was in direct contradiction to Mr. Thomson's statements in the AFFIDAVIT filed in
the Idaho Supreme Court.

B. RESPONDENT CLEARLY VIOLATED I.A.R.l1.2.

Of much more importance, respondent directly violated I.A.R. 11.2 in a significant portion of its
brief I.A.R. 11.2 provides in relevant part:

" ... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney
or party has read the ... brief... ; that to the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law ... and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose such as to harass, or to cause unreasonable delay or needless increase in
the costs oflitigation. If the ... brief ... is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction ... "

Respondent's violation of the above statute involves the last four sentences on page 25 of
respondent's brief. These four sentences, authored by respondent's counsel, are as follows:

"To clarify the record, the so-called denial letter dated June 10, 2010, is not a denial letter.
(R., p. 451-454) It is a reservation of rights letter that was issued during the pendency of
the investigation. Id at p. 451. In fact, the letter specifically states "[t]his is not to be
construed as a denial of your claim. The purpose of this letter is to acknowledge there are
coverage questions with regard to your loss." (R., p. 453)"
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These sentences were outright fabrications. There is no other plausible explanation why these
sentences were included in the brief other than to deceive appellant and the Idaho Supreme
Court.

On June 10, 2010 respondent's claims representative, Dmma Hoyne, sent appellant a five page
letter. (R., p. 811-815) On page 5 of the June 10, 2010 letter, Ms. Hoyne unequivocally stated
that there will be no insurance coverage for appellant's losses. The relevant part of page 5 is as
follows:

"As you can see from the policy language quoted above, there is no coverage for
the water damage to your home, as all known evidence indicates water entered
your structure through the basement foundation wall at a point underground.
Therefore we are unable to assist you with the cost of drying out or repairing
your home." (Emboldening and underlining added.)

It is difficult to imagine a much more definite insurer coverage denial letter than the one quoted

directly above. The last four sentences on page 25 of respondent's brief are directly opposite
from what was said by Ms. Hoyne in her June 10, 2010 letter. (R., p. 811-815)

The June 10, 201 0 letter from Ms. Hoyne could not be more clear that it was a coverage denial
letter. Nowhere in the June 10, 2010 letter does it state that it was only a reservation of rights
letter. Nowhere in the June 10, 2010 letter does it state that it was not to be construed as a denial
of appellant's claim. Nowhere in the June 10, 2010 letter does it state that the purpose of the
letter was to only acknowledge that there were coverage questions with regard to appellant's
loss. (R., p. 811-815)
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On the bottom of page 25 of respondent's brief, the last four sentences, including the quote,
appear to be entirely made up by respondent's counsel. None of the statements, or sentences
quoted,are even arguably contained in the June 10, 2010 letter. It could not be clearer that Ms.
Hoyne's June 10,2010 letter completely conflicts with the language on page 25 of respondent's
brief. (R., p. 811-815)

In summary, "If the ... brief ... is signed in violation of this rule, the court upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction ... " I.A.R. 11.2. Respondent's fabrication concerning the language used in
its claims representative's June 10, 2010 letter is unquestionably in violation of I.A.R. 11.2 and
constitutes grounds for sanctioning

Irrespective of what occurs during this sanction assessment process, appellant is concerned that
respondent has fabricated other facts or conclusions to support its arguments in this appeal.
Appellant is especially anxious that he may miss other fabrications and the Court may base, at
least in part, its appellate evaluation on these fabrications.

II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S!APPELLANT'S MOTION
OF OBJECTION TO THE CLERK'S ENTIRE RECORD FOR THE IDAHO SUPREME
COURT APPEAL WAS IMPROPER

9

Consistently with all other significant matters in this lawsuit, on this motion Judge Hansen again
ruled against Pro Se plaintiff and in favor of defendant State Farm Insurance Company. Such
ruling on this motion is contained in the court's May 15,2012 ORDER and his May 18,2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION. (Exhibits 1 and 2.) As with each of the other important motions,
District Court Judge Hansen did not correctly apply governing statutory and case law.

Moreover, in ruling on this motion, Judge Hansen did not even comport with the Idaho ProSe
Appellant's Handbook. Pro Se appellant in this litigation has relied extensively on that appellant
handbook throughout this appeal. The chart of the handbook which has direct application to this
issue is entitled "Deadlines: Appeals from the District Courts". Below the above title on the left
side of the page is the heading "Document". Below the above title on the right side of the page is
the heading "Deadline (I.A.R.)".

In one rectangular box below the title, on the left side of the page, is the following language:
"Request for Additional Transcript or Record". Directly adjacent to that entry, on the right side
ofthe page, is the answer which is: "14 days from date Notice of Appeal is filed. 19(d)" Along
with the other applicable legal precedent on this subject, Judge Hansen simply ignored this entry.

The primary argument made by Judge Hansen in his MEMORANDUM DECISION is that I.A.R.
19(c) applies only to the initial request for additional documents in the appellate record.
Parties in appeals are never required to perform this mandatory responsibility when any party
in the litigation objects to the District Court Clerk's record. (Paragraph 2 on page 3 of the

MEMORANDUM.)
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He goes on to indicate that in the present case since I.A.R. 29(a) provides for settlement of the
record, which is after the clerk serves the parties with the record, respondent may file its
/{request for this additional materials" within 14 days after the plaintiffs/appellant's motion
objecting to the record was decided and the record was settled. (Paragraph 2 on page 3 of the
MEMORANDUM.}

However, nowhere in I.A.R. 29(a) does it say that a party has 14 days from the date the record
has been settled to file its "request for these additional materials". Moreover, I.A.R. 29(a}
relates to filing objections to the record. Different examples are given in the statute concerning
what objections can be made. Additions to the record is only one example of a type of an
objection which can be asserted. Defendant/Respondent never did object to the record to

request document additions in this case because it never complied with I.A.R. 19(c}.

Both the defendant/respondent and the District Court Judge overlook the fact that I.A.R. 19(c)
And I.A.R. 28(a) makes it abundantly clear that a respondent MUST file a "request for this
additional material" within 14 days of the filing of notice of appeal" ... This obligation is
mandatory based on the language of the statute. Filing the "request for this additional
material", on April16, 2012, 48 days late, is not an acceptable legal failure. I.A.R.19(c)

To circumvent this legal obligation, Judge Hansen merely says that respondent's request is
valid but not necessary because the district court clerk designated the entire record anyway.
On this issue, Judge Hansen failed to consider that the District Court Clerk was never requested
by any party in this litigation within the permissible time period to provide the entire case
record to the Supreme Court.
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Consistent with this premise is that the District Court Clerk did not comply with I.A.R. 28(c).
That rule provides:

"The clerk's ... record shall also include all additional documents requested by
any party in the notice of appeal, notice of cross-appeal, and requests for
additional documents in the record." (Emboldening and underlining added.)

Respondent never requested any additional documents so the District Court Clerk did not act in
compliance with the above statute.

Since the District Court Clerk's designation of the entire case file was not valid, neither was the
defendant/respondent's 48 day belated designated record of the entire case. The
incorrect legal action by the District Court Clerk does not legitimize the incorrect legal action of
the defendant/respondent.

Furthermore, neither I.A.R.19(c) nor I.AR 28(a) contain any language which can be construed as
meaning the settlement of the record becomes the operative date when the 14 day time period
begins to run. In fact, I.A.R.19(c) contains exactly the opposite language. I.A.R.19(c) states:
"respondent MUST file a request for this additional material within 14 days of the filing of the
notice of appeal..." (Capitalization, emboldening and underlining added.)

Respondent's failure to comply with the above statutes has far reaching implications. In the
respondent's brief, State Farm can only refer to the standard record pleadings and documents
and the documents designated by appellant in his Notice of Appeal as set forth in I.A.R. 17(i}.
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The only relevant standard record documents in this appeal are:

C. The original and any amended complaint ....
D. The original and any amended answer ....
K. Notice of Appeal .... {Exhibit 3)
The only documents designated by appellant in his Notice of Appeal are:

"a. Pro Per plaintiffs Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment, including
all attached affidavits and exhibits;
b. District Judge Timothy Hansen's January 9, 2012 MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER granting defendant's Motion for summary judgment;
c. Pro Per plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint, including attached affidavits
and exhibits;
d. Pro Per Plaintiffs Reply Brief on Motion to Amend Complaint, including
attached affidavits and exhibits;
e. Pro Per Plaintiffs Supplemental Brief on Motion to Amend Complaint,
including attached affidavits and exhibits;
f. District Judge Timothy Hansen's May 2, 2011 interlocutory order denying Pro
Per plaintiffs Motion To Amend The Complaint;
g. Pro Per plaintiffs Opposition To Motion For Protective Order, including
attached affidavits and exhibits;
h. District Judge Timothy Hansen's March 15, 2011 interlocutory order granting
defendant's Motion For Protective Order."

The District Court Clerk's Record numbers for the documents designated directly above are: R.,
p. 192-228, 229-260, 275-334, 460-473, 483-484, 527-535, 545-557, 763-833, 847-858.

Assuming that the Supreme Court holds that respondent cannot cite documents anywhere in
the entire District Court Clerk's file in violation ofl.A.R. 19(c) and I.A.R. 28(a), then again
State Farm can only refer to the standard record pleadings and documents and the documents
designated by appellant in his Notice of Appeal as set forth in I.A.R. 17(i).
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant disagrees with some ofthe legal conclusions, and more significantly omissions in
respondent's NATURE OF THE CASE section in its brief. To avoid repetition of appellant's
disagreements, appellant believes that the same entitled section, which is in his initial appellant's
brief is both more accurate and describes the important aspects of this litigation much more
thoroughly.

Appellant apologizes if respondent or the Court construes appellant's repeated referral to the third
incident of water damage as a third claim that appellant is advancing. Appellant is not doing that at
this point in the case. In fact, referral to the ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL on page 22 of
appellant's brief should make it apparent that none of the issues presented on appeal have anything
to do with adding a third claim to this lawsuit.

Appellant referred to this third incident to substantiate the causes of action in the complaint
before it was dismissed by the District Court. Additionally, discussion of the third incident was
done to justify appellant's emotional distress and punitive damage claims.

B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Appellant agrees with the first through ninth proceedings listed in respondent's brief.
14

Appellant disagrees with the tenth and eleventh entries listed in respondent's brief. Appellant
believes the DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS section of appellant's brief is much more
accurate and conveys more information than the similar section in respondent's brief.

The history of the district court's actions in this litigation confirms Judge Hansen's inexplicable
bias against the prose appellant. Now more than ever, after the judge's ruling to deny appellant's
motion to exclude most of the District Court Clerk's entire record, appellant believes that he will
lose and respondent State Farm will win all future motions brought in this lawsuit brought before
District Judge Timothy Hansen.

The most unsettling development in this case occurred in connection with Judge Hansen's ruling
on the summary judgment motion. In the ruling, Judge Hansen awarded State Farm Insurance
Company, the largest insurance company in the United States, attorney's fees for the entire case
to be paid by the pro se plaintiff/appellant. Judge Hansen never gave any plausible explanation
for his ruling which could have caused appellant to declare bankruptcy or lose his home, or both.

On pages two and three of respondent's brief, State Farm Insurance Company, and its counsel,
omit full discussion of some very important events. The initial hearing on the Summary
Judgment Motion was held on November 17, 2011 at 4:00p.m. During the hearing, Judge
Hansen orally granted the motion for Summary Judgment and awarded State Farm all the

attorneys fees it had incurred in the entire litigation.
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Then on February 14,2010 at 3:30p.m., appellant attended a hearing on a motion which was
entitled Motion Re The Proposed Judgment. (Exhibit 4) The hearing was held because State
Farm was seeking its attorney's fees for the entire lawsuit. At the hearing, Judge Hansen granted
State Farm's motion and for a second time awarded attorney's fees in favor of respondent
and against the pro se plaintiff/appellant. At the hearing, the Judge advised State Farm to file
a memorandum within fourteen days setting forth the exact amount of attorney's fees and costs it
had incurred in the entire lawsuit. (See exhibits 4 and 5- appellant's notes of the hearing.)

State Farm never filed the above requested memorandum so the ruling awarding it attorney's
fees was dropped. That is why the final judgment in the case does not refer to any attorney's fees
award to State Farm to be paid by the pro se plaintiff/appellant. (Exhibit 6.)

It is appellant's opinion that in this case the District Judge has been consistently violating the
Code of Judicial Conduct, including Canons 1; 3A., 3B(2), 3B(3), 3B(6), 3B(8), and 3C(l).
Under I.A.R, Rule 48 and any other applicable statutes or case law, appellant requests that the
Honorable Timothy Hansen, District Judge be sanctioned for his improprieties.

C. CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant strongly disagrees with many of the statements contained in respondent's statements in
this section of its brief.
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Respondent's first statement is an opinionated, accusation without any reference to the legally
acceptable part of the District Court Clerk's record or to any evidence in this case at all.

Respondent's second statement is an incomplete accusation. Page 322 ofthe District Court
Clerk's record is the beginning of plaintiff/appellant's aft! davit in the motion to amend the
complaint. Page six ofthat document (R., P. 327.) refers to the June 5, 2010 and June 8, 2010
letters. This page of the affidavit listed the letters as Exhibit H and Exhibit I.

Appellant designated pages 275-334, which is the motion to amend the complaint with his
attached affidavits and exhibits, The District Court Clerk's record, page 327, is obviously within
that group of pages. Therefore, the page which lists those letters as exhibits is also contained in
the District Court Clerks record.

Since the appellant's designation of documents called for those letters to be included within the
limited record, appellant took all reasonable measures to ensure that the District Court Clerk
performed his duties correctly. This is especially true when appellant learned that the clerk
transferred the entire case file to the Supreme Com1. Because this was done, appellant logically
expected his designated documents to have been included.

Respondent's third statement focuses on a relatively unimportant issue. Moreover, at the outset
of appellant's discussion on this issue, it should be pointed out that the pro se appellant is not a
partner in a law firm as is respondent's counsel. Prose appellant cannot rely on the assistance of
secretaries, paralegals, associates, and other partners for assistance in the lawsuit. Pro se
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appellant does not have the almost unlimited legal office supplies, legal devices, or the legal
technological resources that respondent's counsel does being in a large law firm and representing
the largest insurance company in the United States. Therefore, prose plaintiff was required to
use the documents in his possession as exhibits.

Appellant will now discuss each of the specific criticisms of exhibits in appellant's brief that
respondent raises.

Appellant's exhibit 5 is not a very good copy. It has only three small parentheses and a paperclip
on page 7 of the insurance policy marked as Exhibit 5. This minimal error is on one of twentyfive pages ofthe insurance policy. Again, prose appellant does not have the legal devices and
equipment that respondent's counsel does to prevent such minimal occurrences from happening.

Exhibit 7 contains numerous handwritten entries on pages of the exhibit. At the time the
appellant's brief was prepared only the documents which were at appellant's home could have
been used as exhibits. Appellant admits the error in attaching such an exhibit with handwriting
on it in the appellant brief Appellant requests that such handwriting be ignored by respondent
and this Court.

Appellant sees nothing wrong with Exhibit 8.

18

Exhibit 9 also has handwriting on several of its fifteen pages. This handwriting consists mainly
of circled paragraphs and a few sets of parentheses. Once again, appellant requests that such
handwriting be ignored by respondent and this Court.

Respondent's fourth statement is incorrect. As was previously stated, appellant is not making a
third claim in this lawsuit at the present time. Appellant did discuss the January rainfall and
flooding incident several times but that was for the reasons listed earlier in . Idaho Code of Civil
Procedure, Rule 15(a) this reply brief.

Respondent's fifth statement is correct from a factual standpoint. However, it is not correct from
a legal standpoint. Under the Title of I.A.R. 17(e) "Designation of Appeal", Section I.A.R. 17(f)
provides:

"A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to assert in the
appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal (which refers to those set forth in the Notice
of Appeal.) shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal."

The other documents, conversations, and actions are part of issues which will be further evidence
of the propriety of appellant's causes of action in the complaint and the emotional distress and
punitive damages claims.
Similar to respondent's first statement, its sixth statement (which is only listed in the form of a
footnote.) is an opinionated assertion which appellant believes is in many ways factually
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incorrect and unsupported by law.

On a different subject, which appears later in this section, on page 5 of respondent's Concise
Statement of Facts, it is maintained: "Based upon the information compiled through the
investigation and an analysis of the Policy, State Farm denied the May claim on June 10, 201 0."

On page 25 of its brief, respondent made completely opposite assertions. Respondent's reference
to the same June 10, 2010 letter on page 25 was quoted earlier in this reply brief but will be
quoted again to make it absolutely clear that the opposite contentions were being advanced:

"To clarify the record, the so-called denial letter dated June 10, 2010, is not a denial letter.
(R., p. 451-454.) It is a reservation of rights letter that was issued during the pendency of
the investigation. Id at p. 451. In fact, the letter specifically states "t]his is not to be
construed as a denial of your claim. The purpose of this letter is to acknowledge there are
coverage questions with regard to your loss." (R., p. 453.)"

Given the two sets of inconsistent statements argued by respondent, the reader of respondent's
brief can only wonder;

1. Is the June 10,2010 letter a denial letter, or not?
2. Is the June 10,2010 letter a reservation ofrights letter, or not?
3. Should the June 10, 2010 letter tot be construed as a denial of your (appellant's) claim, or not?
4. Is the purpose of the June 10, 2010 letter only to acknowledge there are coverage questions
with regard to your (appellant's) loss, or not?

Even more problematic for respondent and its attorney is that the inconsistent statements referred
to above heighten and confirm their violation of I.A.R. 11.2.
20

Unquestionably, there is no doubt now that respondent's counsel did not read or understand the
blatant contradiction between page 5 of the June 10, 2010 letter and page 25 of respondent's brief.
There is no doubt now that the conflicting statements on page 5 of the June 5, 2010 letter and page 25
of respondent's brief are not well grounded in fact or warranted by law. There is no doubt now that the
conflicting statements on page 5 of the June 10, 2010 letter and page 25 of respondent's brief were
interposed to harass, or to cause unreasonable delay or needless increase in appellant's costs in this
litigation. There is no doubt now that sanctions are appropriate under I.A.R. 11.2 because of the
respondent's and its attorney's violations of this statute.

IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

At the beginning of the ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL Section, it is claimed that:
" ... (the) issues listed in Appellant's Brief are insufficient, incomplete, or present additional issues for
review. I.A.R. 35(b) (4). Consistent with Rizzo's Notice of Appeal, Rizzo fails to list any issues on appeal."
(See respondent's brief, page 5)

In the same paragraph on page 5, respondent's counsel contends that he will"attempt" to
set forth those issues on appeal Rizzo did not set forth." Once again, it is difficult to understand
respondent's assertions.

Initially, it is hard to believe that respondent's counsel read or understood appellant's Notice of
Appeal. On page 3 of the Notice of Appeal it is stated: "Plaintiff intends to assert the following issues on
appeal regarding District Judge Timothy Hansen's judgment and orders in this litigation. On the
following page, the title of the list of issues is JUDGMENT AND ORDERS APPEALED. There are six issues
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set forth below the title.

Secondly, it appears that the above language is simple enough to understand as presenting the issues
being appealed from and discussed at length in the appellant's brief. Perhaps respondent is criticizing
appellant's presentation of the issues as being judgments or orders instead of setting forth an extremely
lengthy list of factual contentions. What respondent is overlooking is I.A.R. 17(e), which is entitled
11

Designation of Appeal. Subsection (1) of I.A.R. 17(e) is entitled as follows: Designation of the
Judgment or Order Appealed From. The notice of appeal shall designate the judgment or order
appealed from .... " (See also I.A.R. 35(a) (4)

Therefore, respondent's argument concerning the inadequacy of respondent's listing of issues is both
factually incorrect and in contradiction of the applicable law. Respondent's listing of issues on appeal is
improperly advanced, not necessary, and misstates the issues appellant has correctly presented in his
Notice of Appeal in accordance with the Idaho Appellant Rules.

V. ARGUMENT

A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW ON APPEAL

1. Waiver of Appeal by Respondent Concerning Propriety of Summary Judgment Motion

in Contention
Decisive on almost every issue in this appeal of respondent's summary judgment motion is the
subject of whether there was a waiver by respondent. Waiver is in direct rebuttal of

22

respondent's theme that there was no coverage. This no coverage theme was set forth again
and again and again in respondent's brief.

The language contained on page 4 of appellant's motion to the Supreme Court not to permit
the entire Clerk's record for this appeal, which sets forth the gist of appellant's argument on
waiver, is as follows:

11

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO REQUEST FOR THIS
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL

On the Clerk's Certificate of Appeal, across from the: "Attorney for Respondent" entry,
the name James D. LaRue was crossed out in pen ink. Then in pen ink the name Jeffrey
A. Thomson was written on that line. This establishes that defendant's/respondent's
counsel possessed and read the document. Further down the page there is an entry
entitled "Respondent's Request for additional clerk's record filed "Across from that
entry the line is left blank. (Exhibit 7)

Defendants/respondent's counsel did not write or type in any statement on the above entry. Then
on AprilS, 2012, which was 36 days after State Farm Insurance Company's "request for additional
material" was mandatorily due; defendant's/respondent's attorneys authored and sent a letter to
the Clerk of the District Court and the Supreme Court. In the letter it was stated:

"With this correction {removing James D. LaRue's name and replacing it with
Jeffrey A. Thomson's name"), the Clerk's Certification of Appeal appears to be in
order." {Exhibit 8)

In clear error, the District Court Judge ruled that neither the absence in the Clerk's Certificate of
Appeal nor defendant/respondent's April 5, 2012 letter constituted a waiver by State Farm
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Insurance Company.

For both of these reasons the District Court Judge's ruling should be overturned on appeal.

2. Standard of review for Summary Judgment Motion

Appellant disagrees with respondent's biased title for this subsection which is contained in
respondent's brief so appellant changed the title. Appellant does agree with the very limited
case law authority cited in respondent's brief. However, the case law cited is woefully
incomplete. To provide a complete and correct standard of review for a summary judgment
motion appellant is going to repeat the standard set forth in his Opposition to the Summary
Judgment Motion:

"Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 56( c) sets forth the standard for granting or
denying summary judgment motions. It provides: " ... The judgment sought shall
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law ... ".
"The court must liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor of the
nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of
the nonmoving party". State of Idaho, et al. v. Rubbermaid Incorporated, an Ohio
corporation 129 Idaho 353, 355-356 (1996). See also Miguel Arreguin v. Farmers
Insurance Company of Idaho 145 Idaho 459, 461 (2008); Farmers Ins. Co. of
Idaho v. Talbot 133 Idaho 428, 431 (1999); Bonz v. Sudweeks 119 Idaho 538,
541 (1991).
"If there are conflicting inferences contained in the record or reasonable minds
might reach different conclusions, summary judgment MUST BE DENIED."
State ofldaho, et al. v. Rubbermaid Incorporated, an Ohio corporation 129 Idaho
353, 356 (1996), see also Bonz v. Sudweeks 119 Idaho at 538, 541 (1991).
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"When interpreting insurance policies, this court applies the general rule of
contract law subject to certain canons of construction. The general rule is that,
because insurance contracts are adhesion contracts, typically not subject to
negotiation between the parties, any ambiguity that exists in the contract must be
construed most strongly against the insurer." Miguel Arreguin v. Farmers
Insurance Company ofldaho 145 Idaho 459,461 (2008).
"The BURDEN is in on the insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes
to restrict the scope of its coverage." Miguel Arreguin v. Farmers Insurance
Company ofldaho 145 Idaho 459, 461 (2008). (Emphasis added) It is always
defendant's burden of proof to establish that a specific policy exclusion does
apply. Id at 461. "A provision that seeks to exclude the insurer's coverage must be
strictly construed in favor of the insured." Id at 461.
"Under these special rules, insurance policies are to be construed most liberally in
favor of recovery by the insured. The meaning of the insurance policy and the
intent of the parties must be determined from the PLAIN meaning of the
insurance policy's own words. Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co.145 Idaho
313,318 (2008), See also National Union Fire Ins. Co. ofPittsburg v. Dixon 141
Idaho 537, 540 (2005)

"This Court (the Idaho Supreme Court) has recognized a 'special relationship
between insurer and insured which requires that the parties deal with each other
fairly, honestly, and in good faith' and acknowledge the disparity in bargaining
power between an insurer and insured. Featherstone et al. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125
Idaho 840, 843, 875 (1994) ... Policyholders purchase insurance to help protect
themselves from some of the financial consequences created by mishaps such as
occurred here. They place trust and confidence in the insurer." Weinstein, et al, v.
Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, et al. 149 Idaho 299, 339
(2010). (R., p.764-765)

3. Standard of Review for Contract Interpretation Issues

Discussion of the standard of review for insurance contracts, not all contracts, is extensively
discussed above and will not be repeated here.

4. Standard of Review for Motion to Amend Complaints
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Appellant again objects to the biased title in this subsection and changed it. Appellant also
seriously objects to the characterization of the law made by respondent, especially the second
sentence of the subsection, which plainly distorts and misstates the law. To adequately and
honestly state the law on this subject, appellant is going to refer to his Motion to Amend the
Complaint. Idaho Code of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a) sets forth the applicable law relating to
the amendment of complaints after a responsive pleading is served or the action is set for trial. It
is stated in Rule 15(a) that" ... a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court ... , and leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires, ... " (R., p.285.)

5. Standard of Review for Punitive Damages

Again, respondent's statement concerning this standard is misleading and completely inadequate.
Appellant's correct interpretation of this standard is as follows.

According to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell et al. 538 U.S.
408 (2003)1 the United States Supreme Court held that a punitive damage award in a state was
authorized by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. (R., p.285.)

Idaho Code Section 6-1604(2) provides in relevant part:

"In all civil actions (in Idaho) in which punitive damages are permitted, no claim
for damages shall be filed containing a prayer for relief seeking punitive
damages. However, a party may, pursuant to a pretrial motion and
after hearing before the court, amend the pleadings to include a prayer
for relief seeking punitive damages. The court shall allow the motion to
amend the pleadings if, after weighing the evidence presented, the
court concludes that, the moving party has established at such hearing
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a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an
award of punitive damages."

Idaho Code Section 6-1601 (9) provides:

"Punitive damages" means damages awarded to a claimant, over and above what
will compensate the claimant for actual personal injury and property damage, "to
serve the public policies of punishing a defendant for outrageous conduct and of
deterring future like conduct.". (R., p.285.)

6. Standard of Review for Motion For Protective Order

Appellant once again objects to the biased title in this subsection and changes it. Appellant also
seriously objects to the deceptive and incomplete characterization of the applicable law advanced
by respondent.

To provide a complete and accurate standard of review for a motion for protective order,
appellant will repeat the standard set forth in his opposition to respondent's subject motion.

Idaho Rule of Ci vii Procedure, 26(b) ( 1) provides in part:

"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to
a claim or defense ... "

B. ANALYSIS
1. The District Court Did Not Realistically Consider, Let Alone Follow, Applicable
Summary Judgment Principles

The above entitled subsection, subsection 1, begins on page 8 in respondent's brief and ends on
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page 14. The argument contained in the brief is significantly based on portions of the District
Court Clerk's record which were not properly requested or designated by respondent pursuant to
I.A.R. 19(c) or 28(a).

The improper portions of the District Court Clerk's record replied upon by respondent, in the
order listed in respondent's brief include pages 843, 693-694, 695-696, 369, 373-377, 383, 427
723, and 758.

There are so many improper record references in this subsection that it is extremely difficult to
determine which parts of the arguments made are inappropriately based on such references.
Therefore, Subsection 1 should be ignored in its entirety.

If this Court decides not to do so, then appellant will state the following facts. Respondent does
correctly share some of the applicable statutory law on the summary judgment standard. I.R.C.P.
56(c). However, respondent completely omits discussion of any of the governing case law.

That case law includes: State of Idaho, et al. v. Rubbermaid Incorporated, an Ohio corporation
129 Idaho 353 (1996), Miguel Arreguin v. Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho 145 Idaho 459
(2008), Farmers Ins. Co. ofldaho v. Talbot 133 Idaho 428 (1999), Bonz v. Sudweeks 119 Idaho
538 (1991), Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co.145 Idaho 313 (2008), National Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburg v. Dixon 141 Idaho 537 (2005), Featherstone et al. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125
Idaho 840(1994), and Weinstein, et al, v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company,
et al. 149 Idaho 299 (2010).
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In the event this Court disagrees in any way with the above premises advanced by appellant, he
will now analyze respondent's arguments briefly. Appellant would like to clarify to this Court
though that he has already arguably rebutted respondent's arguments in detail in the appellant's
brief, pages 23-27.

It is noteworthy to initially emphasize that the applicable statute, I.R.C.P. 56(c), makes it

abundantly clear that summary judgment should only be granted when the nonmoving party
in the case cannot show a genuine issue of any material fact. In the present case, only appellant
has experts. Plaintiff's first expert is on causation issues. The second expert is on coverage and
damages issues. (R., p. 768, 772-776.)

Respondent has no experts. Appellant is certainly not an expert as respondent contends.
Respondent claims representatives, agents and team managers are not experts either. (R., p. 768,
772-773, 783.)

In this appeal, appellant has gone well beyond demonstrating that there are numerous genuine
issues of material facts in this case. Appellant has submitted the only admissible evidence on the
causation and coverage issues in this case. Respondent has no admissible evidence at all on these
crucial issues. Consequently, the summary judgment motion unquestionably should have been
denied.

2. The District Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment on the Breach of Contact
Cause of Action

Respondent's argument in the above entitled subsection begins on page 14 in respondent's brief

29

and ends on page 27. The argument contained in the brief is substantially based on repeating
portions of the District Court Clerk's record which were not properly requested or designated by
respondent pursuant to I.A.R. 19(c) or 28(a).

In the order listed in respondent's brief the improper portions of the District Court Clerk's record
replied upon by respondent in this section include pages 408, 408-410, 411, 152, 724, 735, 736,

453, 103, 12, 16, and 386-426. Many of these citations are repeated again and again in this
subsection.

Almost equally as problematic for respondent is its continued reference to cases in entirely
different jurisdictions and involving considerably different factual situations. These cases cited
also involve completely different insurers and disparate policy language. These improper cases
are cited one or more times on pages 17, 18, 21, 22, and 24.

What happened from a litigation perspective during Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast, the
worst natural disaster in U.S. history? The injuries and losses were incredibly widespread and
tragic, but that litigation was entirely different from this case. (Home Insurers' Secret Tactics
Cheat Fire Victims, Hike Profit R., p. 244-259)

What happened in the Insurance Company ofNorth America litigation in Washington, which
again involved a different jurisdiction, different insurer, different policy language and different
factual situation? That lawsuit was so dissimilar to this case that it cannot even be mildly
persuasive. This is true in all the out of jurisdiction cases cited by respondent.

There are so many improper record references in this subsection that it is extremely difficult to
determine which parts of the arguments made are inappropriately based on such references.
In the event this Court disagrees with the above premises in any way, appellant will now analyze
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respondent's arguments briefly. Appellant would like to clarify to this Court the topics raised in
respondent's brief are not new topics. They have already been rebutted in detail in appellant's
brief, pages 27-39.

Initially, appellant would like to address the subject of whether the Homeowners' Insurance
policy is ambiguous or not. At the outset appellant stresses "The burden is on the insurer to use
clear and precise language if it wishes to restrict the scope of its coverage." Miguel Arreguin v.
Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho 145 Idaho 459,461 (2008). "A provision that seeks to
exclude the insurer's coverage must be strictly construed in favor of the insured." Id at 461.

Throughout respondent's brief, its counsel repeatedly and fervently disagrees with appellant
about the meaning of each policy provision of even questionable relevance. Respondent's
counsel argues every time that he is right and appellant is wrong in his understanding and
interpretations of the policy. Appellant believes respondent's counsel is incorrect in his
interpretation of the policy. Such completely different viewpoints, by themselves alone, make it
indisputably clear that the policy is ambiguous.

It is also important that on page 7 of the Homeowners Policy in Section 1, - LOSSES

INSURED, it is stated that coverage is provided for Explosion, Riot or civil commotion, or
Aircraft (including self propelled missiles and spacecraft) etc. Nowhere in the LOSSES
INSURED SECTION does it say that if such damage occurs to the physical structure of the
dwelling, there would be no coverage. This is despite the fact that logically the above incidents
would cause tremendous damage to the dwelling.
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Moreover, even more important is that there is not a single reference to rain in the LOSSES
UNINSURED portion of the Homeowners Policy. Given these and other facts discussed above,
ifthe policy is not ambiguous, then it is explicitly in appellant's favor.

Respondent devotes so many pages to the concurrent cause argument and the references to rain
in its appellate brief, that these contentions will be specifically and briefly discussed here, even
though they are analyzed to a great extent in appellant's brief.

The concurrent cause argument fails in this case for two reasons. The first is that the concurrent
cause provision cited by State Farm's counsel, on page 16 of respondent's brief, is certainly
unintelligible to the average insured. Even the vast majority of engineers who design homes and
general contractors who build homes would wonder what that utterly confusing language means.

Secondly, the actual causes of the extensive damages suffered by appellant are rain and wind
blowing in the right direction. Neither of these occurrences are excluded events. This is evident
from a review of the policy. Wind is not discussed as an excluded event. Rain is discussed as a
SECTION I- LOSSES INSURED, but not in the LOSSES UNINSURED section at all.

Perhaps in making his numerous accusations about appellant's interpretation of Homeowners
Policy provisions, respondent's counsel overlooks the governing case law on this subject in
Idaho. Again, "The burden is in on the insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes to
restrict the scope of its coverage." Miguel Arreguin v. Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho 145
Idaho 459,461 (2008). "A provision that seeks to exclude the insurer's coverage must be strictly

32

construed in favor of the insured." Id at 461. The absence of the words "wind" and "rain" in the
LOSSES UNINSURED SECTION defeats all respondent's arguments in this section.

Respondent also waived its right to make any arguments in support of the contractual segment of
the summary judgment to motion.

Additionally, appellant believes that subsections a., b., c., and d. in subsection 2 of respondent's
brief have already been refuted at length in this reply brief on pages 3-8,8-13, 19-20,20-21, and
in appellant's brief, pages 27-39.Therefore, appellant does not wish to belabor the points he has
already made.

3. The District Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment on the Bad Faith Cause of
Action

In appellant's brief, this subject was discussed in detail on pages 39-40 of the brief. In addition, it
is useful to emphasize that the misconduct of insurers, of which State Farm is the largest in the
country, is set forth in detain in HOME INSURERS SECRET TACTICS CHEAT FIRE
VICTIMS (R., p. 241-249.) (Exhibit 9.)

Suffice it to say there was a legally enforceable contract between appellant and respondent,
which respondent State Farm failed to legally perform. In the interest of brevity, this discussion
will not be stated again here.

4. The District Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment on the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
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In appellant's brief, this subject is discussed in detail on page 40 of the brief. It is important to
emphasize that there was a legally enforceable contract between respondent, which respondent
State Farm breached.

In the interest of brevity, the full discussion set forth on page 40 of appellant's brief will not be
repeated here.

5. The District Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment on the Negligence Per Se
Cause of Action

Again, in the interest of brevity, the full discussion set forth on page 40- 41 of appellant's brief
will not be repeated here.

6. The District Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment on the Failure to Warn
Cause of Action

Once again, in the interest ofbrevity, the full discussion set forth on page 41-42 of appellant's
brief will not be stated again.

7. The District Court Improperly Denied the Motion to Amend the Complaint

Appellant discussed this matter thoroughly in the appellant's brief on pages 42-46 of the brief.
Moreover, appellant's past discussion in this reply brief establishes that there was a legally
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enforceable contract between appellant and respondent, which respondent State Farm failed to
legally perform.

There is only one subject that it sensible to emphasize at this juncture. That is again the article by
the national news agency, Bloomberg Markets Magazine. The article is entitled HOME
INSURERS SECRET TACTICS CHEAT FIRE VICTIMS (R., p. 241-249.) It provides details of
insurers misconduct, including State Farm's, all over the country. (R., P. 241-259.)

In the interest of brevity though, the above topic which was discussed in detail in the appellant's
brief and the reply brief will not be repeated here.

8. The District Court Improperly Granted the Motion For Protective Order

Finally, in the interest of brevity the full discussion set forth on pages 4 7-48 of appellant's brief
will not be repeated here.

VI.

CONCLUSION

For all the above reasons, Plaintiff requests that this Court vacate the District Court's
proceedings set forth above, remand the case for further proceedings, and provide the relief

35

requested from respondent State Farm Insurance Company, its counsel, and District Judge
Timothy Hansen.

Respectfully submitted this 9th day of July, 2012

By,
Roger Daniel Rizzo, In ProSe
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EXHIBIT
1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ROGER DANIEL RIZZO,
Case No. CV-OC-1023300

Plaintiffs,

ORDER

VS.

STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
The above entitled matter having come before the court for hearing on Plaintiffs
Objection to the Clerk's Record on the 14th day of May, 2012, and good cause appearing
therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiffs Objection to the Clerk's Record is DENIED; and

2.

Defendant's Request for Additional Records is GRANTED.

DATED this

~~

-day of May, 2012.

Honorable Timothy Hansen
Ada County District Judge

ORDER- 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of May, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roger Daniel Rizzo
1583 North Sundown Way
Eagle, Idaho 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission

Jeffrey A. Thomson
Elam & Burke, P.A.
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission

ORDER-2

EXHIBIT
2

e1AT L L t.USL ------

Fl~B.J:~

No.

A.M.

.

MAY 18 2012

IN fHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS'I:R.Lc:I:nk

~f"ft'rn'j1 VM1ER

THE STATE
2

OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF ADA

D. RICH, C erk

By KARl HOPP

oePVTY

3

EVA MARIE RIZZO and ROGER
DANIEL RIZZO.
Plaintiffs.
6

vs.

LU

ll

Case No. CV OC 1023300
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND SUBSTITUTE ORDER RE:
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
THE CLERK'S RECORD

8

"\ (\

STATE FARM INSURANCE
COMPANY.
Defendant.

1 0

BACKGROUND
This is an action ansing from a dispute regarding insurance coverage for damage to Plaintiff
_s

Roger Daniel Rizzo· s home. Pursuant to its Memorandum Decision and Order entered on January
9. 2012, the Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of Plaintiffs
claims. A Judgment entered on February 15, 2012, dismissing Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice.
On January 27, 2012, prior to entry of the Judgment, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal. On April

12.2012, Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Clerk's Record for the Idaho Supreme Court Appeal. as
well as a Notice of Motion of Objection to the Clerk's Record for the Idaho Supreme Court Appeal.
20
21

I

The Affidavit of Roger Daniel Rizzo was attached to Plaintiffs objection. On April 16, 2012.
Defendant filed an Opposition to Objection to the Clerk's Record, along with DefendantRespondent's Request for Additional Record. Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion to Object to the Clerk's Record was filed on April 19,2012.
Heanng on these matters was held on May 14. 2012, at which time the Court ruled from the
bench. On May 15. 2012. the Court entered an order concerning these matters. However. for the
benefit of the record, the Court now feels it more appropriate to issue a written decision setting

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- Page t

EXHIBIT B

fort!1 its reasoning with regard to those rulings. This written decision will serve as a substitute order
for the one issued on May I 5, 2012.
2
3

DISCUSSION
Idaho Appellate Rule 28 sets forth the contents of a "standard record," and provides that the

5

parties "are responsible for designating the documents which will comprise the clerk's record on
appeal." l.A.R. 28(a). (b).

In his Notice of Appeal, Plaintiff listed eight documents which he

G

wished to be included in the clerk's record in addition to those documents already included
pursuant to I.A.R. 28. At the May 14. 2012, heanng. Plamtiff mdicated that at some point he spoke
8

to the appeals clerk of the District Court. who informed Plamtiff that a disc containing the entire

9

court file in this matter had been sent to the Idaho Supreme Court. Shortly thereafter. Plaintiff filed

lG

his ohJeCtion to the clerk· s record.
Settlement of the clerk's record in connection with an objection to such record by either
party is a matter within the discretion of the district court. Lamar Corp. v. City ofT>vin Falls. 133

l2

Idaho 36, 40,981 P 2d 1146, 1150 (1999), citing Aker v. Aker, 52 Idaho 50, 56-57, 11 P 2d 372,
375 (1932).

As Defendant has noted, an objection to the clerk's record on the grounds of

overinclusiveness would appear to be somewhat unusual.

However, the Idaho Supreme Court

addressed such an objection in Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls. In affirming the district court's
l5

denial of a party's request for deletion of certain documents from the clerk's record. the Idaho
Supreme Court concurred with the following reasoning of the district court:
[T]he Supreme Court has the determination as to what Information in the record it will
consider as relevant. However. the Supreme Court cannot consider items outside of
Because of this. judicial economy would dictate that it is
the record on appeal
better to include an item that the Supreme Court is free not to consider than to wrongly
strike it and go through the additional process of augmentation.

Lamar Corp .. 133 Idaho at 40. 981 P.2d at 1150. This reasoning is especially applicable in the case
21

at bar. as Plaintiff, in filing his Notice of Appeal, did not specifically identify the issues
encompassed by the appeal Considered as a whole, the Court in its discretion concludes that the
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clerk's record. which presently consists of the entire court file, is sufficient and appropriate. For
purposes of judicial economy, the Court finds that the present record should continue, thereby
avoiding the potential necessity for augmentation of the record at a later date pursuant to fAR 30
Accordingly. Plaintiffs objection to the clerk's record is overruled

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- Page 2

Plaintiff has mgued that Defendant's request for additional record is untimely pursuant to
I.A.R. l9(c). which provides. in pertinent part:
When the appellant has requested the standard transcript per l.A.R. 25 and the
standard clerk's or agency's record per I.A.R. 28 and the respondent wants to include
additional documents, the respondent must t!!e a request for this additional material
\vithin 14 days of the filing of the notice of appeal or within 14 days of the amended
notice of appeal that eliminated these additional documents.

s
However. while I.A.R. 19(c) is applicable to the initial "designation of the record.'' Defendant's
6

request was brought pursuant to l.A.R. 29(a). which deals with "settlement'' of the record. Idaho
1

Appellate Rule 29(a) prov1des that after the clerk

the distnct court serves the parties with the

I

transcript and record. the parties ··shall have 28 days from the date of service

within which to

file objections to the transcript or the record, including requests for corrections, additions or
lO

deletions." See ({/so ramar Corp.. 133 Idaho at 40, 981 P.2d at 1150. As noted above. Plaintiff's
objection to the record was filed on April 12, 2012, shortly after he discovered that the clerk's

ll

record contained the entire court file, and Defendant's request for additional record was filed within
12

a few days of Plaintiffs objection, on April 16, 2012.

13

Request for Additional Record, which seeks the inclusion of the entire district court file, is

14

unnecessary since the current clerk's record already includes the entire court file. For the reasons

In any event, Defendant-Respondent's

set lorth above. the clerk's record will remain unchanged.

CONCLUSION
Plamt1ffs Objection to the Clerk's Record for the Idaho Supreme Coun Appeal
12
19

overruled.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this /8;K-day of May, 2012.
'

~--

TIMOTHY HANSEN
District Judge

2:
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IS

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
l. Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority. do hereby certify that 1 have mailed. by
United States MaiL on this 2day of May, 2012, one copy of the ORDER as notice pursuant to
Rule 77(d) LC.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:

ROGER DANIEL RIZZO
!583 NORTH SL~DOWN WAY
EAGLE. IDAHO 83616
JEFFREY A. THOMSON
ELAM & BURKE. P A
251 EAST FRONT STREFT. SUITE 300
P.O. BOX I 539
BOIS DE. IDAHO 83 70 l

10

11

12

CHRISTOPHER D. RlCH
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

13

l0

1 "
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No. _ _~'7:n---A.M. _ _ _ _-~~~~---

Roger Daniel Rizzo
1583 North Sundown Wav
"
Eagle, Idaho 83616
938-1615
rogerrizzo4 7@yahoo.com
In Pro Per

JAN 2 7 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk
By JAMIE RANDALL '
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

Roger Daniel Rizzo,
Plaintiff

) CASE NO.
) cv oc 1023300
)
)

Vs.

) NOTICE OF APPEAL
) APPELLATE RULE 17

State Farm Insurance Company,
Defendant

)
)

_________________________ ))
NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE FARM
INSURANCE COMPANY, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
NOTICE OF APPEAL- page 1

1. The above named appellant, Roger Daniel Rizzo, appeals to the Idaho
Supreme Court against the above named respondent, State Farm
Insurance Company, from the JUDGMENT AND ORDERS listed
below.
The judge whom the motions at issue were brought before was District
Court Judge Timothy Hansen. The Honorable Judge Hansen also
presided over the motion hearings and entered the judgment and orders,
which are now under appeal.
2. The plaintiff has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
judgment and orders described below are appealable pursuant to Rule
ll(a)(l) and ll(a) (3) ofthe Idaho Appellate Rules (l.A.R.).
3. The plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit, Roger Daniel Rizzo, is
unemployable. Plaintiff was involved in a horrible motor vehicle
accident over 16 years ago. During the accident, plaintiff suffered life
threatening injuries to multiple parts of his body, including sustaining
severe, traumatic brain injury. Plaintiff was hospitalized for over six
months and almost all of the doctors who treated him told his family that
he would die.
Plaintiff has been certified by physicians as one-hundred percent
disabled. His disability certification is permanent. He will remain onehundred percent disabled for the remainder of his life. (Documents
confrrming this infirmity will be attached to plaintiff's appellant brief.)
As a result of the acute injuries he sustained during his accident, plaintiff
Roger Daniel Rizzo has not been employed for compensation by any
employer since his horrible motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff also
experiences seizures and has sleep apnea. Both of these additional

NOTICE OF APPEAL- page 2

conditions also make him unemployable. (Documents confirming these
infrrmities will be attached to plaintiff's appellant brief.)
Plaintiff survives economically on disability proceeds and social security
income. He could not afford to pay for Idaho counsel to represent him in
this matter so he is representing himself in ProSe.
After reviewing the Idaho District Court - For the District of Idaho Pro
Se Handbook, plaintiff felt more comfortable about having to represent
himself in this lawsuit. One of the paragraphs in Chapter 1 of the
Handbook provides:
"The mission of the United States District and Bankruptcy Courts for the
District of Idaho is to provide an impartial and accessible forum for the
just, timely, and economical resolution of legal proceedings within the
jurisdiction of the courts, so as to preserve judicial independence,
protect individual rights and liberties, and promote public trust and
confidence."
The defendant in this lawsuit, State Farm Insurance Company, is
represented by James D. LaRue and Craig R. Yabui of the Elam and
Burke, P.A. Law Firm. Defense counsel's address is 251 East Front
Street, Suite 300 P.O. Box 1539 Boise, Idaho 83701. Defense counsel's
telephone number is 343-5454. Defense counsel's fax number is 3845844. Neither of the attorneys representing State Farm Insurance
Company lists their e-mail addresses on pleadings, discovery, or motions
in the case.
4. Plaintiff intends to assert the following issues on appeal regarding
District Judge Timothy Hansen's judgment and orders in this litigation:

NOTICE OF APPEAL- page 3

JUDGMENT AND ORDERS APPEALED

A) District Judge Timothy Hansen's January 9, 2012 MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER granting defendant's MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Please refer to paragraph 5 in Pro Per
Plaintiff's Affidavit.)
B) District Judge Timothy Hansen's upcoming JUDGMENT WITH
PREJUDICE dismissing Pro Per plaintiff Roger Daniel Rizzo's entire
lawsuit. (Please refer to paragraphs 6 and 7 in Pro Per Plaintiff's
Affidavit.)
C) District Judge Timothy Hansen's May 2, 2011 interlocutory order
denying Pro Per plaintiff's MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT
TO ALLEGE A PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIM.
D) District Judge Timothy Hansen's May 2, 2011 interlocutory order
denying Pro Per plaintiff's MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT
TO ALLEGE A CLAIM FOR DIMUNITION IN VALUE OF
PLAINTIFF'S HOME.
E) District Judge Timothy Hansen's May 2, 2011 interlocutory order
denying Pro Per plaintiff's MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT
TO ALLEGE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURY.
F) District Judge Timothy Hansen's March 15, 2011 interlocutory order
granting defendant's MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER.
5. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.
6. The ProSe appellant cannot afford and does not request a reporter's
transcript.
NOTICE OF APPEAL -page 4

7. The appellant requests that the following documents in the
clerk's record be copied and sent to the Supreme court in addition to
those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
a. Pro Per plaintiff's Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment,
including all attached affidavits and exhibits;
b. District Judge Timothy Hansen's January 9, 2012 MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER granting defendant's Motion for summary
judgment;
c. Pro Per plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, including attached
affidavits and exhibits;
d. Pro Per Plaintiff's Reply Brief on Motion to Amend Complaint,
including attached affidavits and exhibits;
e. Pro Per Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief on Motion to Amend
Complaint, including attached affidavits and exhibits;
f. District Judge Timothy Hansen's May 2, 2011 interlocutory order
denying Pro Per plaintiff's Motion To Amend The Complaint;
g. Pro Per plaintiff's Opposition To Motion For Protective Order,
including attached affidavits and exhibits;
h. District Judge Timothy Hansen's March 15, 2011 interlocutory order
granting defendant's MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER.

8. I certify:
a. That the estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record has
been paid.
b. That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
c. That service has been made on the party required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20. Defendant's counsel's address is:
ELAM & BURKE, P.A,
251 EAST FRONT STREET, SUITE 300
BOISE, IDAHO 83701-1539

NOTICE OF APPEAL- page 5

Dated: This 26th day of January, 2012.

'A o'J. 'it

() ""f\ w/. 'f<.rz..-.o
oger Daniel Rizzo
In Pro Per

NOTICE OF APPEAL -page 6

EXHIBIT
4

=~=~==-~ . §:::;;~~:;~~ty-::.::~c:-~~-~~'!.=.=-=-······=
~---=== +~0u_dq;;_1~;;;j};L~·;;:;.{L-~~~~~~~- ~:. ~----~~=

-----+~~,5-".a:.-f P.!J~ _A,ru,_L'f_d.~__ '~-"'.....fl.lL. _________ ·------~~- ..£'L __..r&iLfd- .6.e£. _c&2:.~L~ . . . _·--~-----------~

-~------·--·-----~'"',--~----,-,-·"-·-·· --L,.c_~-v.-~

...).,______I,L__ _..!)Id"'"'Y··"·-'--·L"L----

-------------

_TQ _ ~--- ~QVlJ. 1-j --------~------------

ATTORNEYS FEES

On February 14, 2012, a hearing was held on the Motion Re The
Proposed Judgment. The motion was brought because State Farm was
seeking attorney's fees for prevailing on its Summary Judgment Motion.
The motion was for the payment by plaintiff In ProSe of all attorney's
fees incurred by State Farm to defend the entire lawsuit. In the
courtroom, the judge granted the motion and ruled against plaintiff.
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CHRISTOPHER D f~ICH. Cieri<

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

EVA MARIE RIZZO and ROGER DANIEL
RJZZO,
Case No. CV -OC-1 023300
Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT
vs.
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
The Court, having entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment on January 9, 2012, and the Court having previously entered its Order of
Dismissal dismissing all claims that are or could have been stated by or on behalf of Eva Marie
Rizzo in the Complaint filed on November 24, 20 l 0, and all claims that may be stated by or on
her behalf in any amendment thereto, with prejudice, on March 15, 2011, therefore, entry of
Judgment concerning all claims against Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
(erroneously sued as State Farm Insurance Company) is now proper.

JUDGMENT- 1

Accordingly, JUDGMENT is hereby entered under the standards of Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, DISMISSING Plaintiff Roger Daniel Rizzo's Amended Complaint against State
Farm Fire and Casualty Company, in its entirety, and WITH PREJUDICE.
Attorney fees and costs of litigation respecting the claims asserted by Roger Daniel
Rizzo, if any, will be assessed and ordered in a manner consistent with Rule 54 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.
.f~"-jnrcv~

DATED this Icj-L~ day of .hmuary,'20 12.
n+

Timothy Hansen
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

r (L
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1
day ofJatH:taFy 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:

Roger D. Rizzo
1583 North Sundown Way
Eagle, Idaho 83 616

X

James D. LaRue

"-

P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701

ELAM & BURKE,

JUDGMENT- 2

'I

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
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rN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IEVA MARJE RIZZO,
Plaintiff,

and
ROGER DANIEL RJZZO,

1

SUPREME COURT NO. }; Ob /

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff- Appe !!ant,
I

I
1

vs.

STATE FAfu\1
COMPANY.

INSURfu~CE

.

Defendant-Respondent

Appeal from: Fourth Judicial Distnct, Ada County.
Honorable Timothy Hansen, pres1ding.
District Court case number: CV -OC-20 10-23300
Appealed from: Memorandum Decision and Order, filed January 9, 2012.
Attorney for Appellant: Roger Daniel Rizzo, Appellant Pro Se
Attorney for Respondent: J.affiea 0. LaR~:~e ~,\"·tJ·'~\...'-A, ;c.-\ I y \_ \_ 11
Appealed by: Roger Daniel Rizzo
·
.;
Appealed against: State Farm Insurance Co.
Notice of Appeal filed: January 27, 20 J 2
Amended Notice of Appeal filed:
Second Amended Notice of Appeal filed:
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed
Appellate fee paid: Yes
Respondent's Request for addit10nal clerks record filed·
Respondent's Request for additional reporter's transcnpt filed:
Name of Reporter:
Was reporter's transcript requested') No
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ELAM & BURKE
ATTORNEYS AT L;\W

JEFFREY A THOMSON

251 East Front Str<:eL Suite 300
i>ost Ortlce Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone 208 343-5454
Fax 208 384-5844

E-mail jat@elamburke.com

May 15,2012

Via Hand Delivery

Honorable Timothy Hansen
Ada County District Judge
200 West Front Street
Boise, ID 83 702
RE:

Roger Daniel Rizzo v. State Farm Insurance Company
Ada County Case No. CV-OC-2010-23300
Supreme Court Docket No. 39611
E&B File No. 1-1274

Dear Judge Hansen:
Enclosed please find the original and two copies of a proposed Order. I would ask that
you please review the Order. If the Order meets with your approval, please sign the original and
have your Clerk conform the copies to be returned to the parties in the enclosed envelopes.
Thank you and please call should you have any questions or concerns.
Very truly yours,

JAT/nlp
Enclosures
cc:
Daniel Rizzo (w/encl.)
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"--,, Home Insurers' Secret Tactics Cheat Fire
Victims, Hike Profits

By David Dietz and Darrell Preston -August 3, 2007 00:12 EDT

Julie Twmell and neighbors stand near rebuilt homes

Robert Hunter, a former Texas insurance commissioner

hth..,. IIUN.IW
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Katherine Merritt, poses in Marietta, Georgia

Amy Bach, executive director of United Policyholders

Dr. Terry Bennett sits among his belongings

Tim and Michele Ray in front of their tornado damaged ho
Aug. 3 (Bloomberg) -- Julie Tunnell remembers standing in her debris-strewn driveway when the tall
man in blue jeans approached . Her northern San Diego tudor-style home had been incinerated a week

htto://www. bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=home&sid=ai OpZROwhv. .. 2/14/20 11

--o------earlier in the large~t wildfire. in California history. The blaze in October and November 2003 swept
across an area 19 times the s1ze of Manhattan, destroying 2,232 homes and killing 15 people.
Now came another blow. A representative of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. the
largest home insurer in the U.S., came to the charred remnants of Tunnell's home to tell her,the
company would pay just $220,000 of the estimated $306,000 cost of rebuilding the house.

"It was devastating; I stood there and cried," says Tunnell, 42, who teaches accounting at San Diego
City College. "I felt absolutely abandoned."
Tunnell joined thousands of people in the U.S. who already knew a secret about the insurance
industry: When there's a disaster, the companies homeowners count on to protect them from financial
ruin routinely pay less than what policies promise.
Insurers often pay 30-60 percent of the cost of rebuilding a damaged home -- even when carriers
assure homeowners they're fully covered, thousands of complaints with state insurance departments
and civil court cases show.
Paying out less to victims of catastrophes has helped produce record profits. In the past 12 years,
insurance company net income has soared-- even in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the worst natural
disaster in U.S. history.
Highest-Ever Profits
Property-casualty insurers, which cover damage to homes and cars, reported their highest-ever profit
of $73 billion last year, up 49 percent from $49 billion in 2005, according to Highline Data LLC, a
Cambridge, Massachusetts-based firm that compiles insurance industry data.
The 60 million U.S. homeowners who pay more than $50 billion a year in insurance premiums are
often disappointed when they discover insurers won't pay the full cost of rebuilding their damaged or
destroyed homes.
Property insurers systematically deny and reduce their policyholders' claims, according to court
records in California, Florida, Illinois, Mississippi, New Hampshire and Tennessee.
The insurance companies routinely refuse to pay market prices for homes and replacement contents,
they use computer programs to cut payouts, they change policy coverage with no clear explanation,
they ignore or alter engineering reports, and they sometimes ask their adjusters to lie to customers,
court records and interviews with former employees and state regulators show.
'It's Despicable'
As Mississippi Republicari U.S. Senator Trent Lott and thousarids of other homeowners have found,
insurers make low offers -- or refuse to pay at all -- arid then dare people to fight back.
"It's despicable not to make good-faith offers to everybody," says Robert Hunter, who was Texas
insurance commissioner from 1993 to 1995 and is now insurance director at the Washington-based
Consumer Federation of America.
"Money managers have taken over this whole industry," Hunter says. "Their eyes are not on people
who are hurt but on the bottom line for the next quarter."

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=home&sid=aiOpZROwhv ... 2/14/2011

T?e industry's drive for profit has overwhelmed its obligation to policyholders, says California
L1eutenant Governor John Garamendi, a Democrat. As California's insurance commissioner from
2002 to 2006, Garamendi imposed $18.4 million in fines against carriers for mistreating customers.
"There's a fundamental economic conflict between the customer and the company," he says. "That is,
the company doesn't want to pay. The first commandment of insurance is, 'Thou shalt pay as little and
as late as possible."'
Allstate Hires Consultant
Although the tension between insurers and their customers has long existed, it was in the 1990s that
the industry began systematically looking for ways to increase profits by streamlining claims
handling.
Hurricane Hugo was a major catalyst. The 1989 storm, which battered North and South Carolina, left
the industry reeling from $4.2 billion in claims.
In September 1992, Allstate Corp., the second-largest U.S. home insurer, sought advice on improved
efficiency from McKinsey & Co., a New York-based consulting firm that has advised many ofthe
world's biggest corporations, according to records in at least six civil court cases.
State Farm, based in Bloomington, Illinois, and Los Angeles-based Farmers Group Inc., the thirdlargest home insurer in the U.S., also hired McKinsey as a consultant, court records show.
'Boxing Gloves'
McKinsey produced about 13,000 pages of documents, including PowerPoint slides, in the 1990s, for
Northbrook, Illinois-based Allstate. The consulting firm developed methods for the company to
become more profitable by paying out less in claims, according to videotaped evidence presented in
Fayette Circuit Court in Lexington, Kentucky, in a civil case involving a 1997 car accident.
One slide McKinsey prepared for Allstate was entitled "Good Hands or Boxing Gloves," the tape of
the Kentucky court hearing shows. For 57 years, Allstate has advertised its employees as the "Good
Hands People," telling customers they will be well cared for in times of need.
The McKinsey slides had a new twist on that slogan.
When a policyholder files a claim, first make a low offer, McKinsey advised Allstate. If a client
accepts the low amount, Allstate should treat the person with good hands, McKinsey said. If the
customer protests or hires a lawyer, Allstate should fight back.
"If you don't take the pittance they offer, they're going to put on the boxing gloves and they're going
to batter injured victims," plaintiffs attorney J. Dale Golden told Judge Thomas Clark at the May 12,
2005, hearing in which the lawyer introduced the McKinsey slides.
The Alligator
~

One McKinsey slide displayed at the Kentucky hearing featured an alligator with the caption ',Sit and
Wait." The slide says Allstate can discourage claimants by delaying settlements and stalling court
proceedings.
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By postponing payments, insurance companies can hold money longer and make more on their
investments-- and often wear down clients to the point of dropping a challenge. ·'An alligator sits and
waits, ". GoJdenEtold the judge, as they looked at the slide describing a reptile.
App 11cat10n rror
McKinsey's advice helped spark a turnaround in Allstate's finances. The company's profit rose 140
percent to $4.99 billion in 2006, up from $2.08 billion in 1996. Allstate lifted its income partly by
paying less to its policyholders.
'Stars in Alignment'
Allstate spe~t 58 percent o~ its premium income in 2006 for claim payouts and the costs of the process
compared With 79 percent m 1996, according to filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.
The payout expense, called a loss ratio, changes each year based on events such as natural disasters;
overall, it's been decreasing since Allstate hired McKinsey.
Investors have noticed. Allstate's stock price jumped fourfold to $60.95 on July 11 from its closing
price on June 3, 1993, the day of its initial public offering. During the same period, the Standard &
Poor's 500 Index rose threefold.
State Farm's profits have doubled since 1996 to $4.8 billion in 2006. Because State Farm is a mutual
company, meaning it's owned by its policyholders, it doesn't have shares that trade publicly.
''This is about as good a stretch as I've seen," says MichaRChren, who manages $1.5 billion at
Allegiant Asset Management Co. in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, and has followed the propertycasualty industry for 20 years.
The industry's performance during the past five years has been superb, even with payouts for Katrina,
he says. "All the stars have been in alignment," he says. "There has been decent pricing of products
and an extremely attractive and very low loss ratio."
'More Audacious'
Reducing payouts is just one way the industry has improved profits.
Carriers have also raised premiums and withdrawn from storm-plagued areas such as the Gulf Coast
of the U.S. and parts of Long Island, New York -- to lower costs and increase income, says Amy
Bach, executive director of United Policyholders, a San Francisco-based group that advises
consumers on insurance claims.
''What this says is that the industry has been raking in spectacular profits while they're getting more
and more audacious in their tactics," she says.
Allstate spokesman Michael Siemienas says the company won't comment on what role McKinsey
played in lowering the insurer's loss ratio and boosting its profits. Allstate did change the way it
handles homeowners' insurance claims, he says.
-----~-

'Absolutely Sound'
''In the early 1990s, Allstate redesigned its claims practices to more efficiently and effectively handle
claims and better serve our customers," he says.
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"Allstate's goal remains the same: to investigate, evaluate and promptly resolve each claim based on
its merits," Siemienas says. ··Allstate believes its claim processes support this goal and are absolutely
sound."
McKinsey doesn't discuss any of its work for clients, spokesman Mark Garrett says.
Jerrv Choate, Allstate's chief executive officer from 1995 to 1998, said at a news conference in New
York in 1997 that the company's new claims-handling process had reduced payments and increased
profit, according to a report in a March 1997 edition ofNational Underwriter magazine.
Insurers can't make significantly more money just from cutting sales costs, he told reporters. ·'The
leverage is really on the claims side," Choate said. ··If you don't win there, I don't care what you do
on the front end. You're not going to win."
The more cash insurers can keep from premiums, the more they can invest. This pool of assets -- most
of which the companies invest in government and corporate bonds -- is known as float.
·Better Than Free'
"Simply put, float is money we hold that is not ours but which we get to invest," billionaire Warren
Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., wrote in his annual letter to shareholders this year. "When
an insurer earns an underwriting profit, float is better than free," he wrote in 2006.
Omaha, Nebraska-based Berkshire Hathaway generated 51 percent of its $11 billion profit in 2006
from insurance.
Claims payouts for the entire property-casualty industry have decreased in the past decade. In 2006,
carriers paid out 55 percent of the $435.8 billion in premiums collected, according to the Insurance
Information Institute, a trade group in New York.
That compares with a 64 percent payout ratio on $267.6 billion in premium revenue in 1996. As
companies pay less to policyholders, their investment gains are growing, according to the trade group
and research firm A.M. Best Co. in Oldwick, New Jersey.
·Purpose Evaporating'
The industry has increased profits by an annual average of 46 percent since 1994, Institute data show.
In 2006, carriers invested $1.2 trillion and recorded a net gain of $52.3 billion, up from $713.5 billion
invested for a gain of $39.1 billion in 1994.
Insurance companies are no longer following their mandate to take care of policyholders' money and
then pay it out when needed, says Douglas Heller, executive director of the nonprofit Foundation for
Taxpayer and Consumer Rights in Santa Monica, California.
··The whole purpose of insurance is evaporating before our eyes as we continue to send checks to the
companies," Heller says. "Insurers are looking to shed their purpose as a risk bearer and become
financial institutions."
~~

That kind of criticism is unwarranted, says Robert Hartwig, chief economist at the Insurance
Information Institute. He says about 1 percent of policyholders contest what they're offered.
·Justifiably Proud'
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:'The insu:ance industry ~an be justifiably proud of its performance," Hartwig says. "It's in the
msurance mdustry's best mterests to settle claims as fairly and as rapidly as possible."
Companies have sharpened the use of technology in the past 20 years to help tighten claims payouts.
Insurers following McKinsey's advice on claims processing have adopted computer programs with
names such as Colossus and Xactimate.
Colossus, made by El Segundo, California-based Computer Sciences Corp., calculates the cost of
treating people injured in auto accidents, including the degree of pain and suffering thev'll endure and
any permanent impairment they may have, according to Computer Sciences' Web site. ·
Xactimate, made by Xactware Solutions Inc. of Orem, Utah, is a program that estimates the cost of
rebuilding a home.
'Designed to Underpay'
Insurers sometimes manipulate these programs to pay out as little as possible, lawsuits have asserted.
"Programs like Colossus are designed to systematically underpay policyholders without adequately
examining the validity of each individual claim," former Texas insurance commissioner Hunter told
the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on April 11.
He also criticized Xactimate. ''If you don't accept their offer, which is a low ball, you end up in
court," Hunter said. "And that was the recommendation of McKinsey."
Computer Sciences and Xactware declined to comment.
Farmers Group, a subsidiary of Zurich Financial Services AG, agreed in 2005 to stop using Colossus
to evaluate claims filed by policyholders who have accidents with uninsured or underinsured drivers.
The move was part of a $40 million settlement in a class- action lawsuit in Pottawatomie County
District Court in Oklahoma in which the plaintiffs claimed the company had repeatedly and wrongly
failed to pay enough for crash injuries.
'A Toothy Grin'

An internal e-mail introduced in the Farmers lawsuit shows the company had pressured its adjusters,
whom it calls claims representatives, or CRs, to pay out smaller amounts -- and rewarded them when
they did.
''As you know, we have been creeping up in settlements," David Harding, a Farmers claims manager,
wrote in an e-mail to employees on Nov. 20,2001. "Our CRs must resist the temptation of paying
more just to move this type file. Teach them to say, 'Sorry, no more,' with a toothy grin and mean it."
Harding praised a worker for making low settlements. "It can be done as Darren consistently does,"
he wrote. "Ifhe keeps this up during 2002, we will pay him accordingly."
/-,

Farmers said in court papers that it didn't seek to pay less than customers were due. "The e-mail
speaks for itself," Farmers wrote. "Plaintiffs characterization of it is denied."
'More Efficient'
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Edward Rust Jr., CEO of State Farm, testified in a 2006 civil case that his company revamped its
claims handling through a project called ACE, or Advanced Claims Excellence. McKinsey suggested
the use of ACE, according to evidence presented in the district court of Grady County, Oklahoma.
"Technology has allowed us to really streamline our claim organization to be more efficient and
responsive," Rust testified. He said the company wanted to cut expenses for claims.
In the Oklahoma case, Bridget and Donald Watkins, whose Grady County house was destroyed
during a tornado in 1999, accused State Farm of misrepresenting the damage from the storm and won
a $12.9 million judgment in May 2006. Watkins and State Farm agreed to an undisclosed settlement
after the judgment.
Hunter, who also headed the federal flood insurance program under Presidents Gerald Ford and
Jimmy Carter, told Congress that Allstate, with McKinsey's guidance, gave the name Claim Core
Process Redesign to its strategy to change payout practices.
As pervasive as computers have become in insurance, the key actor in settling claims is still the
adjuster, the person who talks to policyholders and decides how much they should be paid.
'Told To Lie'
Allstate has asked adjusters to deceive customers, says JoAnn Katzman, who worked as a claims
adjuster for Allstate in 2002 and 2003. She says managers regularly came to her office in Farmington
Hills, Michigan, to give pep talks on keeping claim payments down.
They awarded prizes such as portable refrigerators to adjusters who tried to deny claims by blaming
fires on arson without justification, she says. "We were told to lie by our supervisors," says Katzman,
49, who quit by taking a company buyout in 2003. "It's tough to look at people and know you're
lying."
Katzman says an adjuster at Allstate, on orders from a supervisor, told an 89-year-old Detroit fire
victim that Allstate wouldn't replace cabinets in her home even though the insurance policy said they
were covered.
In another case, Katzman says Allstate wouldn't replace a fire-damaged refrigerator -- an appliance
she says was covered. Katzman now runs Accurate Estimating Services, an independent adjusting
company in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan.
Allstate's Siemienas declined to comment on Katzman's statements.
Punitive Damages
Insurers sometimes order employees to offer replacement cost settlements that have no connection to
actual prices of home contents, according to testimony in a civil trial.
A jury in November 2005 awarded Larry Stone and Linda Della Pelle $5.2 million in punitive
damages and $616,000 to construct a new house after finding that Fidelity National Insurance Co. of
Jacksonville, Florida, had underpaid the couple by $183,000 when it offered them $433,000 to rebuild
their two-story Claremont, California, residence.
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During the trial in L~s Angeles Superior Court, Ricardo Echeverria, the couple's attorney, questioned
~enneth ~rak~, president of Canyon Country, California-based RJG Construction Inc., who had been
h1red by F1dellty s lawyers to evaluate damage estimates.
'Do You Think That's Fair?'
'' ~~e you telling us th~t sometimes, because the insurance carriers dictate what amounts they are
w11lmg to allow for urnt costs, estimators then have to comply with that?" asked Echeverria, according
to the court transcript.
··That's absolutely true," Drake said.
'·Do you think that's fair?" Echeverria asked.
"Fair or not, it's the name of our business," Drake said.
Drake declined to comment on his testimony. Fidelity is appealing the award.
A New Hampshire case involving a home destroyed in a fire exposed another insurance company
tactic: changing a policy retroactively.
In April2003, the Rockingham county attorney in Kingston, New Hampshire, found that a unit of
Hartford Financial Services Group Inc. had deleted the replacement cost portion of the homeowner's
policy of Terry Bennett after his five-bedroom house burned to the ground in 1993.
'Wrong End'
Bennett, a physician, sued Twin City Fire Insurance Co., claiming his home and its contents -including antiques and fine art -- were worth $20 million, not the $1.7 million the insurer paid him.
After an 11-year battle, he settled with Hartford in 2004 for an undisclosed amount.
"Fighting an insurance company is like staring down the wrong end of a cannon," Bennett says.
An unprecedented number of people stared down that cannon after Hurricane Katrina. The August
2005 storm killed more than 1,600 people in Louisiana and Mississippi, left 500,000 people homeless
and cost insurers $41.1 billion.
More than 1,000 homeowr1ers sued their insurers in the wake of the storm -- the largest-ever number
of insurance lawsuits stemmirlg from a U.S. natural disaster.
For insurers, the multibillion-dollar question regarding Katrirla was how much of the destruction was
caused by wind and how much by water. Property insurance policies don't cover damage caused by
flooding; homeowners have to purchase separate insurance administered by the U.S. government.
Altering Reports
The wind/water issue has spurred allegations that insurers manipulated the findings of adjusters and
engmeers.
Ken Overstreet, an engineer based in Diamondhead, Mississippi, who examined destroyed Gulf Coast
residences, says someone altered his findirlgs on the cause of the damage to at least four homes.
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"We were working for insurance companies, and they wanted certain results," says Overstreet who
has been a licensed civil engineer since 1981. ''They wanted to get a desired outcome and tha~'s what
they did."
'
Overstreet, who. w~ :vo:king for Houston-based Rimkus Consulting Group Inc., prepared a report on
the Gulfport, MISSISSippi, home of Hubert and Joyce Smith for Meritplan Insurance Co. The engineer
found that both wind and water had damaged the house.
"The winds out of the east would have racked the entire structure to the west and simply lifted the
footings up," he wrote.
Rejected
Meritplan declined to pay anything to the Smiths, telling them that all of the damage was caused by
water. The company sent the Smiths what it said was Overstreet's engineering report.
"Due to the extent of the structural damage to the residence, the storm surge accounted for the
damage," the report they got said.
The Smiths called Overstreet and asked him to look at what Meritplan had sent them. Overstreet savs
he looked at both reports side by side and then told the couple that someone had changed his
•
conclusion after his inspection.
"If they defrauded me, how many more did they defraud?" asks Hubert Smith, 88, a retired
chiropractor. "There's a lot of crap going on."
Six lawsuits against Rimkus allege the company altered engineering reports. ··Those allegations are
absolutely false," says Arch Currid, a Rimkus spokesman. ''There's no fact to those claims. We're
going to vigorously defend ourselves in court, and we're confident we will prevail."
Lawsuit Settled
Ed Essa, a spokesman for Calabasas, California-based Countrywide Financial Corp., the parent of
Meritplan, says the company confidentially settled a lawsuit with the Smiths in March.
Another engineer involved in Katrina, Bob Kochan, CEO of Forensic Analysis & Engineering Corp.,
says State Farm asked him to redo his reports because the insurer disagreed with the engineers'
conclusions. Kochan sent an Oct. 17, 2005, e-mail to his staff saying State Farm executive Alexis
·' Lecky" King asked for the changes.
· 'Lecky told me that she is experiencing this same concern with other engineering companies,"
Kochan wrote. "In her words, 'They are all too emotionally involved and working too hard to find
justifications to call it wind damage."'
Kochan says he complied so State Farm didn't cut its contract with his company. ·'They didn't like
our conclusions," he says. ''We agreed to re-evaluate each of our assignments."
'Serious Concern'
Randy Dowr1, an engineer at Raleigh, North Carolina-based Forensic, wrote this Oct. 18, 2005, e-mail
response to Kochan: "I have a serious concern about the ethics of this whole matter. I really question
the ethics of someone who wants to fire us simply because our conclusions don't match theirs."
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Thee-mails were made public in a civil case against State Farm in Jackson, Mississippi.
State ~arm ~pokesm_an ~hil S~pple_says Kochan's e-mail comments are out of context. He says
somet1mes mformat10n m engmeenng reports doesn't support the conclusions.
One State Farm policyholder in Mississippi was Senator Lott, who lost his home in Katrina. He sued
State Farm for fraud in U.S. District Court in Jackson, after the insurer ruled that his home had been
damaged by water and refused to pay him anything.
"It's long ove~due for this industry to be held accountable" Lott, 65, says. Lott and State Farm agreed
to a confidential settlement in April.
Trent Lott's Bill
Lott has introduced legislation to have insurers regulated by the federal government. That would
supplant a patchwork system of regulation by states. Insurance has no body analogous to the SEC,
which can refer cases to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution.
That doesn't happen with insurers. The most that state insurance departments typically do is impose
civil fines when companies mistreat customers. Such sanctions are weak and infrequent, says Hunter,
the former Texas insurance commissioner.
Before Katrina, no state or federal prosecutor had ever investigated a nationally known propertycasualty company for criminal mistreatment of policyholders. Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood
says a federal grand jury is probing insurance company claims handling after the hurricane.
There was no criminal investigation after State Farm offered just 15 percent of replacement costs to
Michele and Tim Ray, whose house was wrecked by a tornado in April 2006. A contractor estimated
the cost to rebuild the Hendersonville, Tennessee, home at $254,000.
Living Amid Ruins
State Farm made three inspections of the property, Ray says, and sent the Rays a check for $36,000,
which the couple returned. A year after the twister, the couple remained in the damaged home, with
their tattered roof covered by tarpaulins.
In April, after Bloomberg News submitted questions to State Farm about the Ray case, the company
inspected the house again. This time, it gave the Rays $302,000.
"We decided to call it a total loss and agreed to pay the policy limits after deciding the damage was
caused by the storm," State Farm spokesman Shawn Johnson says.
State Farm won't discuss what role McKinsey played in helping the insurer shape its approach toward
customers. Similarly, no official at any insurer that hired McKinsey is willing to talk about the
consulting firm.
·Doing What is Right'
Privately held McKinsey, which has 14,000 employees in 40 countries, has worked for many of the
largest companies in the world, according to its Web site. "We take pride in doing what is right rather
than what is right for the profitability of our firm," Managing Director Ian Davis says in a quote
posted on the site.
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McK~nsey pioneered the ov~rhaul of the property-casualty industry at Allstate. The company hired
McKmsey .m ~ 992 after t~e msurer was spun off from what's now Sears Holdings Corp. of Hoffman

Estates, I.llmois, says David Berardinelli, a Santa Fe, New Mexico, lawyer who won access to view
the McKmsey documents for a limited time during a lawsuit involving an auto accident.
McKinsey a?vised the insurer to pay claims quickly at low amounts while delaying payments for as
long as possible for those who wanted large settlements, Berardinelli says. ··They're capitalizing on
the vulnerability of people" he says.
Berardinelli says McKinsey suggested that Allstate hold so- called town hall meetings with claims
adjusters to urge them to pay less to customers.
Shannon Kmatz, a former Allstate claims adjuster, says she attended some of those sessions. She says
managers told employees to keep claim payouts as low as possible.
Looking at Stock Price
''The leaders of those town hall meetings were always concerned that we were doing our part to help
the stock price by keeping claims down," says Kmatz, 34, who worked for Allstate for three years in
New Mexico in the late 1990s and is now a police officer. ''It was obvious from the get-go that all
they were concerned about was the bottom line."

~..

Just once, at the May 2005 hearing in Lexington, Kentucky, the PowerPoint slides McKinsey
prepared for Allstate were made public. William Hager and his wife, Geneva, who suffered neck and
back injuries after the family's car was rear-ended in a 1997 accident in Lexington, sued the insurer,
claiming the company failed to cover her medical expenses.
The case is scheduled to go to trial in October.
One McKinsey slide prepared for Allstate was called "Zero- Sum Economic Game," a videotape of
the court hearing shows. The slide explains that there are winners and losers, and the insurance
company can win by paying out small amounts.
·Finite Pool of Money'
"There is a finite pool of money," Golden, the plaintiffs attorney, told the judge at the hearing.
"Either it goes to the injured victim or it goes to Allstate's pocket as surplus."
Allstate's attorney at the hearing, Mindy Barfield of Lexington, didn't say anything about the
McKinsey slides. She didn't return phone calls seeking her comments.
Former federal flood insurance commissioner Hunter says the McKinsey approach exploits
policyholders.
··McKinsey presented it as a zero-sum game in which the winners would be Allstate and the losers
would be the claimants," Hunter says. ·'I don't think a claims system should be viewed in that light.
It's against any principles on how you should settle insurance claims. They should be settled on their
merits."
Allstate convinced the judge to seal the McKinsey slides before and after the Lexington hearing. The
insurer has resisted attempts to make the consulting firm's work public in courts across the U.S.,
arguing it contains trade secrets.
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In 2004, the company was sanctioned by the Bartholomew Circuit Court in Indiana and fined $10 000
for refusing to turn over the records to attorney Richard Enyon, representing an auto accident victim.
Allstate held on to the documents and appealed the punishment. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the sanction.
'Go To Court'
Allstate then appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court, which hasn't yet made a decision.
~awsuits in Cali~omia, Florida and Texas have asserted that McKinsey's work for Allstate helped the
msurer cheat clmmants. Records show that through the company's Claim Core Process Redesign
project, Allstate encouraged policyholders to accept small settlements on the spot.

The redesig~ also became a blueprint for fighting more claims in court as Allstate increased its legal
staff, accordmg to a 1997 company newsletter obtained by David Poore, a Petaluma, California,
attorney who has represented homeowners in lawsuits against carriers.
"The bottom line is that Allstate is trying more cases than ever before," the newsletter said. "If the
offer is not accepted, Allstate will go to court, if necessary, to prove the evaluation process is sound."
San Diego Fire
McKinsey-style tactics have spread to insurers large and small, as homeowners discovered after three
wildfires ravaged Southern California in 2003, including the one that hit northern San Diego.
While Katrina struck thousands of low-income families in New Orleans, the San Diego fire affected
mostly affluent homeowners, who fared no better with their insurance companies.
The fire obliterated large sections of Scripps Ranch, a community of 30,000 that sits atop a sagebrush
and eucalyptus mesa, where homes can cost more than $1 million.
After flames swept through the area on winds of up to 50 miles per hour, residents say they expected
their insurance companies to live up to coverage promises and pay the full cost to rebuild.
The Southern California fires led to 676 formal complaints to the state saying insurers offered payouts
that fell far short of actual costs and delayed on paying claims.
No Inkling
One of the Scripps Ranch houses that went up in flames, a four-bedroom, gray-stucco home on a
sloping cul-de-sac, belonged to J.P. Lapeyre, a division director at JDS Uniphase Corp., a Milpitas,
California, maker of telecommunications equipment.
Lapeyre, 41, who is married and has two children, says he had no inkling as he viewed the remains of
his house that his insurance would leave him $280,000 short of what he would need to rebuild.
Representatives of Pacific Specialty Insurance Co. of Menlo Park, California, told him the most the
firm would pay out was $168,075, not even half of the estimated reconstruction cost of $448,000.
The Pacific Specialty representative told Lapeyre in November 2003 that the insurer would pay $75 a
square foot (0.09 square meter) to rebuild his 2,241-square-foot house. "What frustration," Lapeyre
says. "I had to try to prove to them that it would cost $200 a square foot."
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That figure came separately from two builders, Norton Construction and TLC Contractors, both of
San Diego.
Lapeyre's Suit
In February 2005, Lapeyre filed suit in San Diego County Superior Court against his insurer and the
independent broker who sold him the policy, alleging negligence, breach of contract and fraud for
leading him to believe that he was properly covered.
After a fight of 19 months, Lapeyre dropped the suit when Pacific Specialty told a mediator assigned
to the case it wouldn't raise its offer, he says. "We decided it was time to get on with our lives and
move forward," says Lapeyre, who borrowed money to build a new house.
Karen and Bill Reimus, both lawyers, fought their carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., when it told
them it wouldn't pay the couple enough to rebuild their burned Scripps Ranch house.
Karen, 40, says an agent for Boston-based Liberty Mutual assured her and her husband when they
bought their house four months before the 2003 fire that their insurance would replace the home if it
were destroyed.
'A Low Ball'

.~

In a December 2003 letter, two months after the fire, Liberty Mutual offered to pay $40,000 less than
the limit of the couple's policy, Karen says. In early 2004, San Diego-based Gafcon Construction
Consultants determined the cost to rebuild was well above the limits of the couple's policy.
The Reimuses began a phone and letter campaign to convince the company its offer was too low,
Karen says. "It has now been almost seven months since the loss and we are still not agreed as to the
numbers," Karen wrote in a May 13, 2004, letter to Liberty Mutual.
Two weeks later, Liberty Mutual agreed to raise the couple's limits by $100,000, Karen says. ·'This is
clear evidence that the original estimate was a low ball," she says.
Liberty Mutual spokesman Glenn Greenbenz says the company won't discuss the case because its
dealings with policyholders are private.
"The system is set up to take advantage of people when they're at their weakest," Karen says. "We
went to one of the most-expensive companies in the country because we wanted to be ready for a
rainy day. We asked for coverage that would replace the house. We thought replacement meant
replacement."
Allstate Suit
Scripps Ranch couple Leslie Mukau and Robin Seaberg sued Allstate for alleged fraud and negligence
for failing to pay the $900,000 that contractors estimate it would cost to replace their two-story home.

.~-

·

Allstate offered the Seabergs $311,000, according to the 2004 San Diego County Superior Court suit.
Allstate says in court papers the couple hasn't shown the company was negligent and asked for
dismissal of the suit, which is pending.
The California Department of Insurance examined the practices of Allied Property & Casualty
Insurance Co., AMCO Insurance Co. and Allstate in connection with the California fires.
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It fi.ned Allied.and A~C?, both based in Des Moines, Iowa, a total of $20,000 for misleading nine
policyholders mto behevmg they were insured for full value. The regulators cited Allstate for six rule
violations, including that it ignored complaints that it underinsured homeowners.
Fines 'Too Small'
The state didn't fine Allstate, which told the department it had done nothing wrong.
"Fines by state regulatory agencies have been far too small and infrequent to deter unfair business
pra~tices," United Policyholders' Bach says. "It's clear that cheating by insurers is a big, profitable

busmess and regulators can't muster the will or political strength to stop them."
Most homeowners take what insurers offer because they don't realize they're being deceived or
conclude that fighting is too costly and difficult, Bach says.
"Virtually everyone who settles for what the insurer offers is taking less than they're owed," she says.
Homeowners across the U.S. have found themselves in the same situation. Kevin Hazlett, a lawyer,
sued Farmers Group after an April 2006 tornado struck his home in O'Fallon, Illinois.
'Thin Air'
Farmers had offered to pay him $470,000 to rebuild the house. Royal Construction Inc., based in
Collinsville, Illinois, estimated the cost at $1.1 million. Hazlett, 52, accepted a settlement for an
undisclosed amount.
Hazlett says Illinois Farmers, a subsidiary of Farmers, used the Xactimate software program to first
determine what it would pay out. "They're just pulling numbers out of thin air," he says. "There's no
rhyme or reason." Farmers spokesman Jerry Davies didn't respond to requests for an interview.
Bo Chessor, owner of Royal Construction, says he sees insurers refusing to pay coverage limits all the
time. "Most people just roll over and take it because they don't have the money to fight it," Chessor
says. "What the insurance companies are doing is purely robbery."
It may be robbery, but it's rarely a crime. State insurance departments don't prosecute insurance
companies, and the federal government has no oversight. The insurance industry wants to keep it that
way.
Insurance Lobbying
To make their voice heard on federal regulation and other government decisions, insurers spent $98
million on lobbying in Washington in 2006, according to PoliticalMonevLine, a unit of Congressional
Quarterly. That's the second-largest amount spent on lobbying by any group, behind $114.4 million
by pharmaceutical companies.
Property-casualty companies do want something from the government: bailouts. Insurers beseech
states and the federal government to foot more of the bill for rebuilding private homes after natural
disasters.
Florida has a catastrophe fund that insures some homes to reduce payouts by carriers. The fund paid
out about $8.45 billion for storm damage in 2004 and 2005, according to its annual report. The federal
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flood insurance program covers $800 billion of property nationally, which helped the industry
increase profits by 25 percent in 2005, the year of Katrina.
Disaster Just the Beginning
Hom~owners

whose properties have been destroyed by catastrophes contend with low payouts, higher
premmms, software programs that underestimate rebuilding costs and sudden changes in policy
values •• all of which have been calculated methods for insurers to increase profits.
Tunnell, the San Diego accounting teacher whose home burned to the ground, says she thought State
Farm had adequately insured her family when they bought their three-bedroom house in 1992. She
says the policy, destroyed in the fire, provided for "full replacement coverage."
It guaranteed to rebuild the house, no matter the cost, she says. The company offered to pay $220,000
--which was $86,000 less than a $306,000 figure her family got from State Farm's own estimator,
Hers urn Construction Inc. of San Diego, for rebuilding the 1, 700-square-foot house.

State Farm spokesman Supple says the company sent letters in 1997 to the Tunnells and other
policyholders saying that it would no longer offer full replacement coverage. ''Policyholders, by
regulatory order, were sent prominent notices of the coverage change at that time," he says.
'This is Unthinkable'
Tunnell says she doesn't recall being notified. She says her family debated hiring a lawyer and suing,
and eventually decided the battle would be too stressful. The Tunnells took the $220,000 and
borrowed money to build a new house.
"Why is this happening to people over and over again?" Tunnell asks. "State Farm keeps
underinsuring people, and they get away with it. This is unthinkable."
As long as insurers make the rules and control the game, Tunnell and homeowners across the U.S.
won't know whether their homes are fully insured, no matter what their policies say.
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